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TAKING THE LEGISLATIVE TEMPERATURE:
WHICH FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL IS “BEST”?
Victor B. Flatt ∗

INTRODUCTION
The United States will almost certainly enact federal legislation designed to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases within the next two years.
It is uncertain what final form this legislation will take and what variables
will be in play in the discussion. At this stage, even the ultimate target in
greenhouse gas reductions is not yet known. The legislation could have
economy-wide effects, or could only affect certain industries. It might allow the use of offsets or not. It may integrate with existing pollutioncontrol regimes or stand on its own. It will likely create new wealth for certain segments of the economy, but may put others out of business. How
these and other policy choices are resolved could turn out to be the most
important legislative question that our country addresses in the foreseeable
future. 1
As of October 17, 2007, there were at least ten legislative proposals in
Congress that address climate change. 2 As identified by their primary spon∗
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1
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the value of carbon allocations in a U.S. cap and
trade system could approach hundreds of billions of dollars. See TERRY DINAN, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
TRADE-OFFS
IN
ALLOCATING
ALLOWANCES
FOR
CO2
EMISSIONS
1
(2007),
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=8027&type=1 (link). The cost of avoided harm by controlling
climate change is more uncertain, but has been estimated in the trillions. Robert Peston, Report’s Stark
Warning on Climate, BBC NEWS, Oct. 29, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6096594.stm
(link).
2
See Resources for the Future, July 2007 Climate Change Bills in Congress,
www.rff.org/climatechangelegislation (Oct. 31, 2007) (link) [hereinafter July 2007 Climate Change
Bills]; RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, SUMMARY OF MARKET-BASED CLIMATE CHANGE BILLS
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sors, these include Bingaman-Specter, Udall-Petri, Lieberman-McCain,
Kerry-Snowe, Waxman, Sanders-Boxer, Feinstein-Carper, AlexanderLieberman, Stark, and Larson. In addition, other politicians, such as John
Dingell, have announced “plans” for legislation, announced their own goals
for climate change, and/or endorsed various components of the filed bills. 3
Although there has been politicking on both sides of this issue, we have not
yet defined a suitable framework for evaluating the legislation. In the case
of climate change, it is particularly difficult to come up with a workable
framework because of the scope and unusual complexity of the issue. In
fact, because of its connection to so many different parts of the economy,
the impact of climate change regulation is present in issues not necessarily
characterized as climate change, such as automobile efficiency and other
energy legislation. Nevertheless, the more comprehensively we address
climate change, the better. 4
It may seem difficult to propose a framework to judge the effectiveness
of climate change proposals when there is no agreement on the standards
with which we judge legislation generally. 5 Our legislative process is not
transparent, which increases the likelihood of rent seeking 6 and renders it

INTRODUCED
IN
THE
110TH
CONGRESS
(2007),
http://www.rff.org/rff/News/Releases/2007Releases/July2007ClimateChangeBillsinCongress.cfm (follow “Summary of Climate Change Bills Introduced in the 110th Congress” hyperlink) (link) [hereinafter
SUMMARY OF BILLS] (mentioning the Udall-Petri bill, which is a draft that has not been introduced but
retains elements of prior Udall and Petri bills in the 109th Congress; discussion of this bill is based on an
analysis of what is currently expected to be proposed). A specific date is noted due to ongoing alterations in proposed legislation. Legislation cited in this essay refer to the bills in their form as of October
17, 2007.
3
See Darren Samuelsohn, Democratic Leaders Want ‘Strong Bill’ on Global Warming, Waxman
Says, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Mar. 21, 2007 (link).
4
See Darren Samuelsohn & Ben Geman, Boucher Would Delay Energy Conference
for Cap-and-Trade Package, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Sept. 7, 2007 (noting that Boucher argues that
combining climate change legislation with energy legislation into one package is optimal) (link).
5
The mechanics of legislation are well known. Why laws take a particular form is far more difficult to exactly explain or predict. “Public choice” theory, one of the dominant theories of legislation,
has been explained by Professor Edward Rubin:
Public Choice analysis has recently emerged as a leading approach to the study of the legislative
process. Its grim landscape of vote-maximizing legislators, rent-seeking interest groups, budgetaggrandizing bureaucrats, and free-riding citizens has now become familiar territory. Proponents
of public choice assert that it constitutes a comprehensive theory, and they level the dread charge
of idealism and naïveté against those who seek broader vistas and more cheerful prospects.
Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of
Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1991). He goes on to explain the theoretical bases behind public
choice, noting that its tenets should spring from the assumption that “all political participants are rational, egoistic utility maximizers,” which he claims is not in the public interest. Id. at 5. This can be
contrasted with those who view individual utility maximizers as simply the best way to get to over all
societal welfare, as measured by Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation,
Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 64 (1990).
6
“Rent seeking” is when persons seek to capture all benefits produced by efficiencies of the market
or legislation for themselves. For instance, if a new law will increase the market value of a product, to
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difficult to hold the normative discussions necessary to inform the public so
that it can demand the particular kinds of consideration it desires. Political
power-games add another dimension that makes the discussion even more
complex. 7
I will not attempt to devise a comprehensive framework with which to
analyze the desirability of all legislation. But with respect to climate
change, there are certain policy choices that must be debated. An analysis
of these policy choices and their importance creates a common framework
for discussion. We may not all agree that rising temperatures in Alaska are
bad, but knowing the outcome of a particular policy choice provides a basis
for understanding the popular will and opinion regarding the choice. 8
Therefore, this Colloquy Essay specifies: 1) the most important policy
choices at stake in climate change legislation, 2) why they are important, 3)
the best resolution of these issues, and 4) how the current legislative proposals deal with them.
Legislation is a dynamic and iterative process. The legislative proposals analyzed in this Essay may be dropped or changed and other legislation
may be proposed before comprehensive climate change legislation is
passed. 9 Indeed, this Essay and the comments that follow will hopefully
provide impetus for changing legislative proposals in response to a consideration of issues herein. Nevertheless, the scientific underpinnings of climate change, including the range of remaining uncertainties, are well
enough understood that the analytical principles associated with climate
change issues will not change in the immediate future. Therefore, the
analysis of the policy choices herein should inform any forthcoming climate
change legislation and also serve as a resource for examining inevitable
shortcomings and possible amendments in climate change legislation of the
future.
This analysis is divided into two parts. The first part will analyze the
goals or purposes of climate change legislation, and the second part will
“rent seek” would be to try and steer the legislation so that the rent seeker would receive the greatest
percentage of the increase in value.
7
No one could have watched the Senate hearings on climate change featuring testy exchanges between former Vice-President Al Gore and Senator James Inhofe, or hear newspaper commentators refer
derisively to “Al Gore’s movie,” without realizing that personal egos, likes, and dislikes may play at
least as large a role as dispassionate science in what climate change legislation the United States passes.
See, e.g., CNN: Boxer Tells Inhofe Who the Boss is Now, a http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=UWpkBcWsAME (last visited on Dec. 1, 2007) (link).
8
While I hesitate to bring up another variable, it is also important to note how information can
change preferences or even persuade them (which is the basis of advertising). Government has even
used this as an overt policy tool, usually by the moniker of “information and education.” But if this is a
possible result of transparency, it too can be transparent and be considered in the choice itself.
9
On October 16, 2007, it was announced that Senators Lieberman and Warner would propose a bill
that would alter two key areas in prior legislation and ideas floated by the two senators. See Darren
Samuelsohn, Lieberman-Warner Plan Tightens Emissions Cap, Limits Credits, GREENWIRE, Oct. 16,
2007 (link).
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look at the policy choices associated with reaching these goals. 10 The
method of accomplishing these goals would be considered “best” if it
reaches and accomplishes all of the goals in the most efficient way possible. 11
I. WHAT IS THE GOAL OF CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION?
To a casual observer, the goal of climate change legislation might seem
to be simple—to stop climate change. But one quickly sees that expense,
cost allocation, and harm distribution are equally important. Moreover,
some amount of climate change might be tolerable or even preferred by certain groups. Without properly determining goals at this step, these choices
will be made at another time, with high transaction costs due either to incomplete information or failure to determine goals. 12 Furthermore, the failure to identify explicit goals may work in favor of some interest groups who
can exploit this opacity to address other issues sub rosa. 13
A. What Climate Change Effects are we Trying to Avoid?
A climate change legislative goal must, at a minimum, address the
harmful effects that it seeks to avoid—the “effects target.” An effects target
will guide how much we want to avoid temperature rise and other associated effects of climate change. This goal must also specify how that change
can be translated into actual reductions of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) or other
gases that affect climate change. This requires us to determine how much
harm we are willing to endure, whose harm we are concerned about, and
how much we are willing to pay to avoid this harm.
Because CO2 is the primary gas that contributes to the greenhouse effect, which is driving a rise in temperatures and other associated climate
change effects, most discussion of climate change avoidance has focused,
10

Separating out the discussion of goals and ways of reaching the goals helps clarify the issues and
avoid the masking of goal choices as policy implementation choices. See Victor B. Flatt, Saving the
Lost Sheep: Bringing Environmental Values Back into the Fold with a New EPA Decisionmaking Paradigm, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1, 20 (1999).
11
Note this statement is only true if all true goals are included and are addressed. For instance, with
climate change, while the main goal may be to reduce CO2 emissions, another goal may be to do so in a
way that is fair or that does not impose costs on the poor. It is only with respect to all goals that we can
use the term “efficient.” Efficiency in CO2 reductions alone might run counter to other goals that are
important. See Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle be Unbroken?, 24 ENVTL. L. 1707, 1713 (1994) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION
(1993)) (“[A]ctual policy choices [may] reflect societal values other than the explicit reduction of risk to
human life.”).
12
See Flatt, supra note 10, at 20.
13
For instance, if there is concern about other air pollutants in addition to carbon dioxide, a push to
eliminate all other anthropogenic greenhouse gases could be made for purposes of other kinds of health
protection. This may not be a bad thing per se, but without an explicit policy goal it is hard to evaluate
whether the resulting policy is a good one.
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since its inception, on the amount of annual reductions in the emission of
CO2 (and CO2 equivalents) 14 that we will need to avoid the harms that are
associated with climate change. The Rio Framework on Climate Change
and the later Kyoto protocol focused on the reductions in CO2 emissions of
industrialized countries in a relatively short time frame, as a first step towards later reductions. 15 Recent new targets in reductions have been proposed and offered by countries around the world as the next step in fighting
climate change. 16
However, the apparent simplicity of such percentage-gauged reductions masks huge complications in estimating the actual effects of these reductions. A reduction in atmospheric CO2 lags the greenhouse effects of
the gas by forty years or more, meaning that temperatures will rise even if
all greenhouse gas emissions were stopped now. 17 Reductions in one jurisdiction must be compared to reductions or increases in others to ascertain
the worldwide reductions that will occur. Moreover, targets may not translate into actual reductions. With these caveats, however, there is some scientific consensus about the effects of CO2 concentrations on temperature
change and associated climate change effects. Moreover, there is some
consensus on what reductions from historic emissions must occur worldwide to avoid the worst climate change harms.
Current CO2 concentrations are at about 377 parts per million (ppm)
(higher than pre-industrial levels by 40%) and projections indicate that CO2
concentrations will grow by between 63% to 235% by 2050, depending on
programs to reduce CO2. 18 There is consensus that if average global
14

CO2 provides about 70% of the heat retention associated with the anthropogenic greenhouse effects at play in the Earth’s atmosphere. Other gases such as methane, water vapor, and HCFCs also
have greenhouse forcing capabilities. Generally, when greenhouse gas amelioration is discussed, it is
done with respect to CO2 reductions. Nevertheless, it is clearly recognized that reductions in other
greenhouse gases may have the same effect as a different amount of CO2 reduction, and therefore many
discussion of greenhouse gas reductions are in terms of CO2 or amounts of other gases that would be
equivalent to an amount of CO2 reduction. These equivalent gases are very important in any climate
change legislation and will be considered explicitly, infra Part II. However, for ease of discussion I will
drop the parenthetical regarding CO2 equivalents, and one should assume that discussion of CO2 reductions may include reduction of other gases that can be equated to CO2 reductions.
15
See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html (link).
16
See, e.g., The EU’s Contribution to Shaping a Future Global Climate Change Regime,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/future_action.htm (link) (last visited Nov. 16, 2007); Darren
Samuelsohn, Congress Has Its Eye on Int’l Warming Talks, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Sept. 24, 2007
(link).
17
See SIR NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 11–13
(2006),
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3/6/Chapter_1_The_Science_of_Climate_Change.pdf
(link). Although many of the economic assumptions of the Stern Report have been criticized and challenged, its discussion of the scientific basis of climate change and the effects resulting from that are
widely accepted).
18
See T.J. Blasing & Carmen Smith, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Recent Greenhouse Gas Concentrations (July 2006), http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current_ghg.html (link); KEVIN
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warming is kept lower than two degrees Celsuis, the effects of that
temperture rise, while harmful, would not be catastrophic. 19 There is also
consensus that CO2 emissions must be reduced by 50–80% of 1990 CO2
production levels to achieve this lower level of warming. 20
It is from these scientific analyses that we choose reduction targets,
and it is with these scientific analyses that we compare our choices. The
variance of legislative CO2 reduction targets result from the uncertainty in
the science of these predictions, the degree of warming that is acceptable
(with respect to the entire world, a nation, or some identified group), the
technological changes that may exist in the future to address energy production or climate change harms, and the costs a given jurisdiction is willing to
accept. While uncertainty exists as to the effects of average temperature
rise, most nations have embraced the notion that reductions in annual output
of CO2 must be made to stabilize the atmospheric concentrations at a level
to keep average global temperature rise under two degrees Celsius.
In keeping with the above consensus, most of the legislative proposals
analyzed in this Essay target a temperature rise no greater than two degrees
Celcius (3.8 degrees Fahrenheit). Most then translate this temperature rise
limitation into goals for reductions in annual CO2 emissions 21 Nine of the
current legislative proposals—Bingaman-Specter, Udall-Petri, LiebermanMcCain, Kerry-Snowe, Sanders-Boxer, Waxman, Feinstein-Carper, Alexander-Lieberman, and Stark—include either CO2 reduction targets or estimates of CO2 reductions in a specified time frame. 22 The reductions are
made in comparison to historical emissions data and are at least theoretically designed to limit all or most U.S. emissions by this percentage in the
time frame specified. 23 The Larson proposal, one of the tax proposals, 24
does not reference a specified reduction goal in greenhouse gas emissions.

BAUMART ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE DATA: INSIGHTS AND
OBSERVATIONS 15 (2004), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climate%20Data%20new.pdf
(link).
19
Raymond Colitt, World Must Fix Climate in Less than 10 Years, REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN19489506._CH_.2400 (link). The irreversible melting of the
Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets is considered catastrophic and may occur with temperature rise
above two degrees Celsius. Other impacts have also been described as catastrophic.
20
PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101: THE SCIENCE AND IMPACTS
7 (2007), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/101_Science_Impacts.pdf (link).
21
See, e.g., Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s309is.txt (link).
22
See SUMMARY OF BILLS, supra note 2.
23
Id. The legislative proposals very in what percentage of sources the CO2 emissions reductions
will apply to. The Lieberman-Warner proposal will only affect 80% of US CO2 sources, and doesn’t
cover residential or commercial buildings, or the agricultural sector. See Samuelsohn, supra note 9.
Similarly, the current legislative proposals do not address all CO2 or other greenhouse gas reductions
despite many being touted as economy wide.
24
See infra Part II.
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Most of the economy-wide CO2 reductions target at least a 50% reduction in CO2 from 1990 levels by mid-century, though there are some outliers. 25 The largest reduction, 80%, is anticipated to come from the
Waxman and Boxer-Sanders proposals. 26
While each of the proposed statutes reference the importance of avoiding climate change harm, these percentage reductions are not defined with
respect to what variables could affect such a choice, such as what community is considered, the allocation of costs and benefits, and the expectations
of other reductions or future technological changes or solutions. From the
press releases of the legislative sponsors, it appears that all believe that their
reductions are just enough to avoid the worst harm, while inflicting minimal
damage on the economy. Though these “Goldilocks” targets all claim to be
“just right,” they lack valid supporting studies that prove these targets accomplish the climate change mitigation that the legislative sponsors claim.
Even the scientists themselves may not be sure of the probability of temperature rise associated with certain reductions or the distribution and effects of that rise, but failure to be more specific leaves the focus on direct
economic impacts to the detriment of the other concerns.
Moreover, detailing what sectors the percentage reductions cover may
be critical; lack of reductions in certain areas will reduce the supposed
overall reduction and thus the possibility of avoiding the worst climate
change harms. Thus, bills that target a 50% reduction in CO2 from 1990
levels by mid-century, which are qualified by exceptions, such as the Lieberman-McCain proposal, may be less “costly” to the economy in one
sense. However, the costs associated with too many exceptions means that
such a bill may in fact be more costly to our society and economy in the
long run than the Waxman or Boxer-Sanders bills, which target an 80% reduction in CO2 from 1990 levels by mid-century. As proposed in the
Boxer-Sanders legislation, it is possible to revisit reduction targets as new
scientific information comes in, but this same strategy has not worked well
in revisiting human health effects and residual risk in the Clean Air Act’s
control of hazardous air pollutants. 27
B. Whom Are We Trying to Protect?
To analyze whether the legislative goals are sufficient, we must also
know whom the legislation intends to protect. Whether our legislation
seeks to avoid the worst harms only in this country or works to prevent
25

Direct comparison is difficult in the text since some proposals refer to reductions from CO2
amounts produced in years other than 1990. Note also that some sectors may not be covered. A graphical representation that takes some of this into account has been published by Resources for the Future,
comparing reductions across proposals. See SUMMARY OF BILLS, supra note 2.
26
Id.
27
Victor B. Flatt, Gasping for Breath: The Administrative Flaws of Federal Hazardous Air Pollution Regulation and What We Can Learn from the States, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 107, 118 (2007).
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them worldwide is an important consideration. The U.S. will probably suffer fewer effects from climate change than many equatorial countries, and
because it is a developed country, it may have the resources to mitigate
some of the worst harms. But, that does not mean that only purely domestic
considerations should underlie any climate change legislation. Addressing
whether our goals of climate change reduction and mitigation extend
worldwide is important both practically and morally.
Practically speaking, failure to set goals which reflect the interests of
other countries means that our ability to control domestic impacts is lessened. The Bush Administration’s approach to climate change, which focuses almost exclusively on the U.S., has drawn criticism and potential noncooperation from developing countries. 28 Without controls on greenhouse
gas production in developing countries, the U.S.’s best efforts at avoiding
harm may be undermined by the failure of other countries to take action.
This practical concern in turn inevitably brings up issues of social justice and fairness since the lack of consideration of such issues by the U.S.
and other developed nations is ostensibly the biggest barrier to developing
country cooperation in any worldwide system. 29 The European Union,
which is similar to the U.S. in terms of government, economics, and market,
recognizes this. When imposing internal climate change regulations, the
E.U. is careful to note its historic contribution and world-wide responsibility to take action to reduce harms, aside from effects they currently feel or
will feel in the future. 30 Most international discussions about climate
change regulation are likewise about responsibility to the world as a
whole. 31 Unless we wish our legislative efforts in climate change to come
to naught, we must adopt this stance. The explicit acknowledgement of this
goal also simplifies many other policy issues.
First, the ultimate question becomes what the “fair” share of reductions
should be, not what an overall reduction that is equivalent from country to
28

Up to this time, the U.S. response to climate change has exclusively focused on the effects to the
U.S. President Bush’s first climate change initiatives focused on adapting to climate change harm,
rather than mitigating future harm, under the assumption that it was less costly to adjust to the upcoming
higher temperatures than to prevent them coming, at least as far as the United States was concerned.
Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Talks Shift Focus to How to Adapt to Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2002,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/envronmt/2002/1103delhi.htm (link). One of the proffered reasons for not acceding to the Kyoto protocol, given by President Bush, is that it did not set binding limits
on developing countries. Eric Pianin, U.S. Aims to Pull out of Global Warming Treaty, ALBANY TIMES
UNION, Mar. 28, 2001 at A3.
29
See, e.g., Greenland Growing Season Extended Due to Warming/Indonesian President Asks
Other Developing Nations to Press Developed World Over Emissions, GREENWIRE, Oct. 29, 2007 (link)
[hereinafter Greenland Growing Season].
30
See Statement by Ambassador John Bruton on Climate Change, No. 17/05 (Feb. 16, 2005), available at http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2005/2005017.htm (link).
31
See European Commission President Barroso’s Remarks at the UN High Level
Meeting
on
Climate
Change,
No.
99/07
(Sept.
24,
2007),
available
at
http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2007/2007099.htm (link).
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country should be. The question of whether legislation should avoid mandatory domestic CO2 cuts until there are commitments from developing
countries almost disappears. As long as we are producing over four times
the per capita CO2 output as China, it might not matter if the Chinese total
exceeds that of the U.S. Even if our production per capita were equal to
China’s, the historic CO2 contributions stemming from earlier U.S. economic growth, and the benefit we retain from that growth, may imply that
we should allow other countries to follow a similar development mechanism or that we should bear a disproportionate burden in the cost of reduction.
Additionally, the CO2 growth in other countries may be indirectly connected to our own benefit and economic growth. Our market is the largest
in the world and is the ultimate destination of many Chinese goods whose
manufacture is driving much of the CO2 growth in China. Putting a tariff or
limits on goods made in countries without binding CO2 controls, as proposed by the Bingaman-Specter and Udall-Petri legislation, is one method
of addressing the U.S. market’s role in climate change, but not necessarily
the best one.
The most effective way to be in congruence with climate change concerns and efforts by other countries is to set a domestic legislative reduction
target based on international agreement. The Kyoto Protocol was not meant
to be the final agreement in climate change control, since its anticipated reductions only buy time before other reductions are required. There is an increasing push right now for agreement on second generation reductions, and
the framework for a new protocol is expected to be established in Bali in
December. 32 Any such agreement will grapple with the overall worldwide
target reduction and how that reduction should be allocated between the developing world and the developed world. The most recent meeting of countries on the issue included proposals for a 50% cut from current emission
levels to a 50% cut from 1990 levels (representing greater reductions), and
also addressed the need for binding reductions in developing countries. 33
While the expected disagreements materialized, some consensus on reductions and addressing the role of developing countries gives hope that this
forum can provide for consideration of international as well as domestic interests. 34
A possible successor to the Kyoto Protocol that sets binding targets for
all countries, even if the targets are lower for developing countries, would
32

Dean Scott & Mike Ferullo, Meeting of Major Economies Concludes with Countries Divided on
Emissions Goal, [2007] Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 189 (Oct. 1, 2007); Press Release, General Assembly, Actions on Climate Change Will Define Global Legacy Left for Future Generations, Says Secretary-General, As High-Level Event Continues, U.N. Doc. GA/10618 (Sept. 24, 2007),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10618.doc.htm (link) [hereinafter Actions on Climate
Change].
33
Actions on Climate Change, supra note 32.
34
Id.
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ensure that all signatory countries have agreed on how much reduction is
needed, who bears the responsibility for the cost of the reductions, and that
the protection is worldwide. International compliance with such a shared
agreement is more likely, meaning that U.S. efforts will not be dragged
down by lack of action in other countries. In order for legislation to proceed while international discussions are still ongoing, a reduction target that
accommodates current international goals and proposals should be used.
Current international discussions about the relative roles of the developed
and developing countries in reducing the effects of climate change suggest
that the U.S. (and the E.U.) may need to take a higher share of reductions
than developing countries. 35 Thus, domestic legislation that either acknowledges this fact or implicitly targets a range that could be seen as accommodating international agreement is best. This takes into account some
international responsibility and is more congruent with an expected international outcome.
Many of the legislative proposals note the U.S. share of international
emissions compared to its share of world population, and two of the proposals (Kerry-Snowe and Waxman, which are similar in tone) acknowledge
the need for international agreement on climate change. The only other discussion of the relationship between U.S. CO2 reductions and the rest of the
world are in the context of whether the current proposals should require
CO2 reductions in developing countries, or whether they should protect the
competiveness of American businesses. 36
None of the proposals specify what factors should govern the relationship of U.S. emissions to other countries. The expected CO2 reductions in
some of the U.S. legislative proposals (such as the Waxman and BoxerSanders proposals) are in agreement with the emission cuts called for by the
E.U. in the new international discussions, which indicate that international
protection my be part of the overall goal in some of these proposals. However, this goal should be made more specific as it lets the American public
understand what tradeoffs are being made, and also allows for ease in future
climate change legislation targets as more information about worldwide effects becomes available. There may be no “right” answer regarding the
burden our country should shoulder for international responsibilities, but
failure to consider and discuss this will hamper the effectiveness of any legislative efforts.
C. Should Compensation be a Legislative Goal?
Our measure of responsibility for harm is related to the question of
whether we should assist individuals dealing with adapting to existing harm
35

See Greenland Growing Season, supra note 29.
See, e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Coleman Signs on to Cap-and-Trade Plan, ENV’T & ENERGY
DAILY, May 22, 2007, (discussing the possibility of reviewing legislation if other countries do not sign
on or if poverty and unemployment increase) (link).
36
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and expected future harm. Climate change has arguably already caused
harm to a large group of persons, both within our own country and elsewhere.
Many tort suits have been filed seeking redress for such harms, but the
chance of success at this time seems small. 37 The fact that climate change
harms are not best dealt with under traditional tort systems prompts whether
federal legislation should have a compensation system as one of its goals.
With respect to other situations wherein tort recovery was difficult because
of the complexity of environmental harms, federal legislation has intervened in two distinct ways. With respect to hazardous waste, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”) provided recovery of damages to natural resources but did
not provide compensation for prior impacts to human health. 38 However, it
did not preclude common law actions for damages to persons. 39 On the
other hand, compensation for human health impacts were implemented for
black lung disease and considered, but never implemented for asbestosis. 40
This suggests two possible routes to alleviate existing climate change
harms. In this instance, climate change is more like hazardous waste exposure than black lung disease. Those exposed to black lung were an easily
identifiable group, and causation could be easily established, making compensation for human health harms feasible. Harm from hazardous waste
has been more difficult to prove and entangled with other issues, just as
climate change has been. Thus, federal legislation should not seek to legislatively compensate persons or institutions that have been harmed by climate change. This is a practical consideration rather than a moral one.
Where causation is difficult to prove, federal legislation will not help in
awarding damages. Where causation is more evident, traditional tort law
can step in to assist in compensation.
The examples of hazardous waste and black lung suggest a different
approach for future harms, however. In both hazardous waste and black
lung instances, future harm was essentially completely dealt with because
of the related remedial measures for clean-up and abatement that had already occurred with respect to the issue. Climate change is different. Most
harm has yet to occur, and no legislative action can completely remediate
all possible future harm. Nevertheless, legislation can authorize funds to

37

The high profile California suit against auto manufacturers was recently thrown out, but many
other possibilities remain. Carolyn Whetzel, Federal Court Tosses Out Nuisance Claim Filed Against
Six Automakers by California, [2007] Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 2,036 (Sept. 21, 2007).
38
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (2006).
39
42 U.S.C. § 9614 (a) (2006).
40
See ALAN DERICKSON, BLACK LUNG: ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC HEALTH DISASTER 143–82 (1998);
Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons, the Consequences of Asbestos Litigation, 26 REV. LITIG. 583, 596
(2007).
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abate as many future harms as possible, and should do so. 41 Just as
CERCLA evidences a choice through remediation to effectively insulate
people from future harm, 42 climate change legislation should spend money
to abate as many future effects of climate change as possible. This is consistent with our common law principles of fairness, 43 particularly if the legislation might have any preemptive effect.
Initially, when businesses first began to support the idea of comprehensive climate change legislation, it was with the hope that federal legislation
would preempt the patchwork of state and local initiatives that were being
enacted. 44 However, many environmental organizations oppose the preemption of local initiatives, 45 and point to past environmental laws as examples of cooperative federalism that allow a national floor for emissions
but permit the states to go above that floor. 46 This is why a comparison to
principle in prior laws is so important: explicit preemption seems particularly at odds with fairness concerns evident in prior environmental laws
such as CERCLA. 47
Legislation should also take care to avoid implicit preemption if some
compensation or protection scheme is not enacted. None of the current bills
explicitly preempt state programs or state common law, and Senator Boxer
has gone on record as opposing any state preemption provisions. 48 However, the Bingaman-Specter bill includes a provision for financial assistance
to those specifically affected by climate change, with particular provisions
governing the state of Alaska, and it is possible that implicit preemption of
common law might be read into this.
The issue of compensation for harms or adaptation has not been addressed in the goals section of the proposed statutes, though the LiebermanMcCain bill would require a study on effects of climate change on the poor
worldwide, 49 and the Bingaman-Specter bill proposes financial assistance
for coastal areas, natural resources, and Alaskan villages harmed by climate
41

While controversial for other reasons, dikes and levees may lessen some of the harm for rising
sea levels, while relocation of persons to areas less affected by extreme weather could also be done.
42
Victor B. Flatt, This Land is Your Land: Our Right to the Environment., 107 W. VA. L. REV. 1
(2004).
43
Id.
44
Economist.com, Business Calls for Carbon Caps, posting to Democracy in America,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2007/03/business_calls_for_carbon_caps.cfm
(Mar. 20, 2007, 21:30 GMT) (link).
45
Congressional Bill Would Wipe out California Warming Law, Officials Claim, GREENWIRE, June
6, 2007 (link).
46
Though inconsistent common law actions may be prohibited by statutory schemes, the major
statutes do allow the states themselves to set higher standards. See ROBERT C. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 101–103 (5th ed. 2006).
47
Flatt, supra note 42, at 21.
48
Debra Kahn, California Regulators Say Cap-and-Trade Should Limit Free Credits, ENV’T &
ENERGY DAILY, Oct. 9, 2007 (link).
49
S. 280, 110th Cong. § 402 (2007).
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change. 50 The Bingaman-Specter bill is a good start, but any bill should be
more specific about compensation rules and preemption, and should also
address international assistance, even if it is simply to deny it. One possible
model for compensation for harms that can be specifically tied to climate
change (such as the sinking of Alaskan villages) would be to empower a
special master, who could award funds based on specific criteria, similar to
the special master that awarded compensation from the September 11th
Fund. 51
II. WHAT IS THE BEST METHOD OF REACHING OUR GOAL?
The next question that must be addressed is how to best reach the goal
that we have set. Professor Rose discussed four broad methods to implement policy goals in environmental legislation, which she colloquially refers to as “do-nothing,” “keepout,” “rightway,” and “property.” 52
“Rightway” has sometimes been characterized as command and control and
“property” may also be identified as market mechanisms; moreover, other
thinkers and writers may further divide and clarify policy implementation
devices, such as feasibility or education. 53 The pluses and minuses of each
of these methods have been explored and debated, and sometimes they are
linked to what the ultimate goal of the regulation should be. 54
A. Is A Market-Based System Best?
Interestingly all of the climate change legislative proposals would be
considered market-based control regimes, with Bingaman-Specter, UdallPetri, Lieberman-McCain, Kerry-Snowe, Waxman, Feinstein-Carper, and
Alexander-Lieberman, all envisioning a cap-and-trade scheme for CO2, and
Stark and Larson proposing an economy wide tax.
A tax system can control pollution by setting a tax on emissions (such
as for CO2) at a high enough level to discourage such emissions. For instance, one could presumably set a tax on CO2 emissions (or energy production associated with CO2 emissions) that would discourage emissions
enough to reach a CO2 reduction target. Cap-and-trade systems adopt the
target first and then allocate the overall amount allowed by the target to par50

S. 1766, 110th Cong. § 402 (2007).
See James Harris, Comment, Why the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Provides the
Case for a New Zealand-Style Comprehensive Social Insurance Plan in the United States, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 1367, 1400 (2006) (link).
52
Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1991).
53
For example, Professor Driesen has been quite successful in noting that “feasibility” is a policy
implementation mechanism separate from others. See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005).
54
See Rose, supra note 52.
51
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ties in the market to use, sell, or buy (trade) as they please. Cap-and-trade
can be an efficient pollution reduction mechanism because the trading allows the private sector to control emissions at the lowest possible cost (to
the private sector) and also encourages innovation.
Currently, none of our environmental laws attempt to control pollution
through a tax and we have only one cap and trade system, the one for sulfur
dioxide (“SO2”) to control acid rain that was passed in 1990. 55 That all of
the climate change legislative proposals embrace a tax or cap-and-trade system shows just how much these systems have gained in respectability in the
last seventeen years. But there are disadvantages to such a system that indicate the issue must be examined more closely.
There are several good critiques of market-based systems to control
pollution and comparisons of market based regimes, command and control
regimes, and other regimes. The primary critiques of market-based systems
are that they may create hot-spots of pollution which hurt specific groups,
usually the poor or politically powerless; that they are not fair because they
do not necessarily penalize a polluter with the money to purchase pollution
rights; that they send the wrong moral signals; and that they are difficult to
enforce. 56
Of these criticisms, three do not appear to be of much concern when
addressing the regulation of CO2 specifically. Because CO2’s harm is
worldwide and dispersed, there are no “hotspots” for concern. 57 Moreover,
concerns over moral signals seem lessened with CO2 as compared to almost
any other pollutant because CO2 historically has not been seen as a “bad”
thing, so producers are not said to have historically engaged in a bad behavior. Fairness is not as large a concern since all high-energy sector use usually has direct benefit to the general public.
The enforcement issue, however, could be more important than the
others for the regulation of CO2. One of the unique features of the cap-andtrade market in SO2, is that only large coal-fired power plants are involved
in the market. These are relatively limited in number, and already regulated. 58 Therefore, the enforcement and administration costs as well as the
possibility of costs from regulatory failure are relatively low for the benefit
that can be derived from the system. 59 CO2 regulation would be a different
animal altogether. First, CO2 and other greenhouse gases are not limited to
coal-fired power plants, though they are a major source. Mobile sources
55

See 42 U.S.C.§§ 7651c–7651m (2006).
See CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, WILLIAM F. FUNK & VICTOR B. FLATT, LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 390 (2d ed. 2007); Victor B. Flatt, The Enron Story and Environmental Policy, 33
ENVTL. L. REP. 10485, 10493 (2003) [hereinafter Enron].
57
Though collateral pollutants, such as mercury from coal-fired plants, will be affected by any
change in demand and concentration of coal-fired power, and thus cap-and-trade systems could have
collateral localized effects.
58
See Enron, supra note 56, at 10,494.
59
Id.
56
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play a large role, and if a system were to include offsets (see discussion, infra), the entities that must be monitored and regulated mushroom exponentially.
None of the legislative cap-and-trade proposals would subject every
CO2 source to the market mechanism, but in such cases, significant sources
that are left out of the system must still be regulated. For instance Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (or CAFE) standards for automobiles, which
require an automotive seller’s fleet to have a certain fuel efficiency (which
in turn reduces CO2 emissions) is an effective way of controlling CO2 from
automobiles. These have been debated in the related energy bill and should
be part of the climate change solution. Consideration of CAFE standards
(or other method to control CO2 from cars, such as a tax) needs to occur at
the same time as a consideration of any cap and trade proposal to see how
much the relative reductions would cost and how the cost would be allocated.
Even if CO2 met all of the criteria necessary for the efficient use of cap
and trade, some kinds of command and control, particularly those that mandate the adoption of some market standard in certain sectors, can overcome
commons problems and “split actor” problems 60 and bring reductions at
lower cost because of the ease of enforcement. For instance, the EU consideration on the ban of incandescent light bulb sales 61 seems a very costeffective way to increase energy efficiency and thereby reduce the production of CO2. Thus, efficient reduction of climate-changing emissions might
be accompanied by command and control systems, at least in some arenas,
such as automobile design.
In addition, a major nationwide survey demonstrated that a majority of
the American public would actually prefer a command and control system
rather than a market system to control climate change. 62 The fact that this
has not had a major impact on the legislative proposals to date suggests either that the parties proposing the laws have a better sense of what regulation will be effective, or those who propose the laws realize that market
systems may not be as fair and effective but may benefit a particular favored industry or constituency—or some combination of the two.
The difficulty with cap-and-trade enforcement may be why two of the
proposals (Feinstein-Carper and Alexander-Lieberman) only apply to the
electricity sector. It has already been demonstrated that this sector can be
efficiently regulated in a cap-and-trade system. However, limiting the law
60

Split actor problems refer to those situations in which a cost structure is set up so that the person
who makes the buying decision is not penalized by the cost, e.g. the landlord who purchases the cheapest stove, even if its energy use is high and costs tenants more.
61
See Helena Spongenberg, EU Could Ban Incandescent Bulbs, BUSINESSWEEK, June 22, 2007
(link).
62
See Peter Aldhous, Exclusive Global Warming Poll: The Buck Stops Here, NEW SCIENTIST, June
23, 2007, at 16–19 (link). There is also a preferance for a tax system to a cap-and-trade system. Id.
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to this one sector means that overall emissions reductions cannot be as
large. 63 Moreover, it raises fairness concerns. While most Americans use
electricity and would presumably share the cost of increases, the public at
large will not see equitable distribution of costs to the extent that power
plants have their rates set by inconsistent state regulation. 64
Feinstein-Carper and Alexander-Lieberman could be seen as compromise proposals that anticipate further legislation in other sectors, but propose the electricity generation sector first because of the ease of regulation.
Nevertheless, the very concept of proceeding in sectors raises concern.
First, there is no guarantee that future legislation will occur after one sector
passes. Moreover, as discussed above, experience with cap-and-trade in the
electricity generating sector may not be applicable to all industries, requiring individual sector systems in any future legislation. Sector-by-sector
regulation might reduce cheating because trading within sectors will likely
be easier to monitor, but the lack of inter-sector trading or offsets would defeat many of the benefits of a market system in the first place. Economywide proposals may be considered the most efficient and the most fair, but
this consideration must be balanced against the enforceability of economywide limits. 65
The enforcement problems inherent to a cap-and-trade system should
spur a closer look at the legislative proposals that embrace taxation of CO2
content. Such taxes are easier to enforce than cap and trade because they
are picked up at product and service origination and added to final prices.
Economists generally favor a tax because it internalizes any efficiencies of
a trading system (if the price of producing carbon is not recouped in one
sector, it will cease production) without having to monitor a complicated
trading system.
The main objection to a tax system seems to be the belief that the
American public abhors any “tax” and will punish any legislator who proposes or votes for one, even if the tax is incorporated into final prices. 66
Representative Dingell has recently challenged this assumption 67 , and I
leave it to political scientists to further analyze this question and educate the
public. There is also some concern that the appropriate level of “tax” will
not be selected to reach the intended reduction target, a problem that one
need not worry about in cap-and-trade. This is considered an economic science problem, but a general aversion to taxes may mean that this “target”
gets set by other considerations than the most efficient production of CO2.
63

See SUMMARY OF BILLS, supra note 2.
See David Cay Johnston, A New Push to Regulate Power Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2007, at C1.
65
See Darren Samuelsohn, Sanders Shifts Warming Debate With Power Plant-Only Bills, ENV’T &
ENERGY DAILY, April 25, 2007 (explaining that Senatory Carper notes that some accomplisment in one
sector is better than a stalled bill covering all sectors).
66
David Leonhart, Auto’s Friend Shifts Tune on Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007, at C1.
67
Id.
64
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Nevertheless, because of ease of administration, a tax system is probably superior with respect to enforcement and fairness and could be tweaked
to provide relief for the poor or others whom we feel deserve relief from
regulatory impacts.
B. How Should Cap-And-Trade Allocations Be Made?
If a cap-and-trade system is chosen, legislators must choose how to
best distribute the initial allocations that will be subject to trade. Allocations for the right to emit carbon dioxide and equivalent greenhouse gases
will be very valuable. 68 There is already much jockeying for this windfall.
Whether allocations are auctioned or given away will have little effect on
the ultimate economic efficiency of the policy, since trade will efficiently
allocate the allotments. 69 But, this decision will have a large effect on the
United States treasury, consumer prices, and distribution of costs.
If a cap-and-trade system is ultimately chosen, it is imperative that CO2
allocations be auctioned or sold, rather than given away. Current industrial
infrastructure has developed under a different legal regime, meaning that
additional costs will fall heavily on sectors that rely largely on coal-fired
power or utilize other fossil fuel generation, but the additional costs are not
so large that they will completely disrupt an industry sector. Electricity
costs will rise in the South and Midwest, which depend heavily on coalfired power, but according to auction advocates, it should not increase more
than 15%. 70 Some of the money raised through an auction could be set
aside to help low income persons who are hit especially hard by a price increase in electricity or other staples of survival (shelter, food, and clothing),
meeting the legislative goals of equity.
If the right to emit CO2 is auctioned off, it will generate money for the
US Treasury which could be used for spurring low carbon technology or
other purposes. However, this means that the cost of producing energy (at
least for those whose energy production emits large amounts of CO2) would
rise. That likely will cost consumers more.
Like a tax system, a cap-and-trade system that features allocation auctions sends a better market signal and encourages all users to efficiently
price the externalities of CO2. It imposes the price hike more specifically
on the industries that produce the CO2, which should send an economic sig68

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the value of carbon allocations in a US cap and
trade system could approach hundreds of billions of dollars. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRADE-OFFS
IN
ALLOCATING
ALLOWANCES
FOR
CO2
EMISSIONS
1
(2007),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/80xx/doc8027/04-25-Cap_Trade.pdf (link).
69
See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and Supermajority Rules: Three Views
of the Capitol, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (2007) (link).
70
CLEAN AIR WATCH, SHOULD BIG POLLUTERS OWN THE SKY? THE DISTRIBUTION OF EMISSIONS
PERMITS UNDER A FEDERAL GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM (2007) (link).
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nal to produce less of it. An auction also avoids the need to decide whether
to allocate credits based on CO2 production or based on energy output.
If CO2 credits are not sold or auctioned, legislators must decide
whether to allocate the credits based on energy output or historic CO2 output. Between the two, allocation based on energy output is preferable since
it more accurately prices the externalities of CO2 producing activities and
would tilt energy usage towards renewables and efficiency. An allocation
based on energy output would reward those who produce non-CO2 based
power production but still cost consumers of CO2 intensive energy more,
even without money going to the U.S. treasury. An allocation based on historic CO2 production, on the other hand, means that CO2 intensive energy
producers will still be able to produce energy for the same cost structure as
they have always done, which means that at least theoretically prices would
not disproportionately rise in the CO2 intensive areas. However, since CO2
would still be rationed, the price of energy would still eventually go up
overall. It just wouldn’t rise as much in the CO2 intensive areas and
wouldn’t affect the bottom line as much as those who sell CO2 intensive
products (such as coal-fired electricity).
As expected, the electric utilities that already consider themselves energy efficient, or those that produce power without fossil fuels, would prefer either a carbon tax or an allocation based on energy production.71 Doing
this imposes the cost of reducing CO2 on the largest producers of CO2 and
puts the producers (and, by extension, the consumers) of non-CO2 generating energy or more efficiently produced energy at an advantage. Those that
have high CO2 production, such as coal-fired power plants, would prefer
that allocations be distributed based on historic CO2 production. 72 These
producers cite the historic precedent with SO2 and the costs that would fall
on the consumer if allocations are not “given” to coal producers. 73
Determining how to award allocations also implicates the difficulties
of ascertaining information about CO2 production and energy production
and setting a time baseline for making the allocations. The time period the
allocations are based on influences how we deal with prior CO2 cutbacks.
For instance, credits awarded based on CO2 production in a time past (like
1997) would temper the unfairness to producers who made voluntary reductions since that time—this would award them allocations that they can then
sell. This would also penalize producers who have created new CO2
71

See Examining Global Warming Issues in the Power Plant Sector: Before the S. Comm. on Environment & Public Works, 110th Cong. 2–4 (2007) (testimony of Lewis Hay III, Chairman, CEO, FPL
Group), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore
_id=ac3ec28a-a579-4ef1-b840-faba432d7c11 (link).
72
See Examining Global Warming Issues in the Power Plant Sector: Before the S. Comm. on Environment & Public Works, 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (testimony of James E. Rogers, Chairman, President,
and
CEO
Duke
Energy
Corporation),
available
at
http://epw.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=96b0a903-32fc-47f8-9a36-b4ddd9805e2b (link).
73
Id. at 9.
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sources for the sole purpose of capturing possible cap-and-trade allocation
benefits.
The economy-wide cap-and-trade legislative proposals seem to take a
“cut the baby in half” approach to the question of allocation of credits,
where some allowances are auctioned and others are awarded for free based
on historic CO2 or energy output. 74 The Bingaman-Specter bill, for instance, initially gives out 53% of the allocations free to industry CO2 producers (with reductions in later years), and reserves the rest to encourage
low carbon coal development and for auction. 75 Udall-Petri only gives
away 20% of the credits, while the other economy-wide cap-and-trade proposals (Lieberman-McCain, Kerry-Snowe, Waxman, and Sanders) leave the
allocation decision to the EPA (with Lieberman-McCain providing some
guidance on this decision).
With respect to whether any free allocations will be based on historic
CO2 production or energy output, the proposals currently tilt towards the
historic CO2 production. The Bingaman-Specter bill and the Udall-Petri
bill (the only ones to address this legislatively of the economy wide bills)
primarily allocate based on historic CO2 output. 76 This is also followed in
the Alexander-Lieberman bill, which only applies to the electricity sector. 77
The Feinstein-Carper bill, on the other hand, primarily allocates its credits
based on energy output rather than historic CO2 production. 78
Many of the legislative proposals which envision a CO2 allocation do
recognize the need to reward early reducers, with Lieberman-McCain basing allocations on 1990 production (the year of the Clean Air Act’s last major amendment), while Boxer-Sanders and Bingaman-Specter choose 1992
(the year of the Rio conference). 79 The Kerry-Snowe proposal describes
“reward[ing] early reductions” as a legislative goal, but does not specify a
method to do this. 80
74

See July 2007 Climate Change Bills, supra note 2.
See S. 1766, 110th Cong. § 201(a)(1) (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s1766is.txt.pdf (link) [hereinafter Bingaman-Specter
Bill].
76
Id. at § 202(a)(1) & 202(a)(2).
77
See S. 1168, 110th Cong. § 705(c) (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s1168is.txt.pdf (link) [hereinafter AlexanderLieberman Bill].
78
See S. 317, 110th Cong. § 716(b)(2) (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s317is.txt.pdf (link) [hereinafter Feinstein-Carper
Bill].
79
See S. 280, 110th Cong. § 103(c)(2) (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s280is.txt.pdf (link) [hereinafter Lieberman-McCain
Bill]; S. 309, 110th Cong. § 704(f)(2)(B)(ii) (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s309is.txt.pdf (link) [hereinafter Boxer-Sanders Bill];
Bingaman-Specter Bill, supra note 75, at § 206(c)(2).
80
See S. 485, 110th Cong. § 702(a)(2)(f) (2007) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s485is.txt.pdf (link) [hereinafter Kerry-Snowe Bill].
75
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It is surprising that whether allocation should be based on energy output or historic CO2 output has not received more attention. In many of the
bills, it is difficult to determine which method is being used (some use
terms such as “heat output” rather than CO2 or energy output), and the legislative press reports do not focus on this distinction. Even major environmental organizations have been more likely to focus on the “safety valve”
issue as the environmental bugaboo rather than the impact that allocation of
credits based on historic CO2 emissions might have on encouraging clean
energy. 81 However, since this decision alone is worth billions of dollars to
certain segments of the economy and since the initial distribution will have
a large impact on how quickly consumers and industry turn to energy with
lower CO2 production, this is a very important point. Part of the tendency
to award based on historic CO2 production may be a hold over from the use
of the SO2 system as a model or a holdover from what was at one time believed to be politically feasible. Closer examination of the costs and benefits of the different allocation systems may push the American public
towards a different conclusion.
C. Offsets
Any cap-and-trade system for CO2 must also address the question of
offsets. An offset is anything that will actually reduce CO2 production (or
sometimes future CO2 production) at one location, which can then be credited against CO2 production at another location. For instance, if a party has
100 credits which allow the production of 100 tons of CO2, but wishes to
emit 110 tons, instead of buying 10 more credits under the cap-and-trade
system, that person might “offset” the extra ten tons of CO2 by eliminating
ten tons of CO2 production elsewhere. This could be done through retiring
a source, creating a physical system to absorb CO2, or (more controversially) avoiding an increase in future CO2 production by providing alternate
methods of energy that do not produce CO2. This is essentially a “purchase” of offsets that takes place outside a cap-and-trade system.
Offsets are very complex, but would add greatly to the efficiency of a
system, allowing for faster and cheaper reductions. They are also a mechanism for transferring some of the benefits of compliance to developing
countries. The main concern with offsets is which ones should be allowed.
Presumably, we wish offsets to actually do what they are intended to do.
This means that any offsets will require proper measurement systems, verification systems, scientific consensus and consideration of possible unintended consequences. With respect to verification, the current state of the

81

See Press Release, Environmental Defense, Bingaman Proposal Reflects Growing Support for
Mandatory
Climate
Change
Policy
(July
10,
2007),
available
at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/pressrelease.cfm?ContentID=6606 (link).
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CO2 trading system in the EU is under critical evaluation. 82 The EU has recently discovered that its initial CO2 allocations and some offsets were improperly reported by the CO2 producers, which inflated the number of
credits in the system. Because the EU did not have any mechanism in place
to verify what sources were actually producing, the system was improperly
designed.
Some proposals for carbon offsets may be scientifically suspect. Biological carbon sinks, which—theoretically, at least—absorb CO2, are under
increased scientific scrutiny and criticism 83 because some, such as tree
planting in the far northern hemisphere, may contribute to warming rather
than offsetting it. 84 Others, such as a plan to seed the ocean with iron filings near the Galapagos Islands to spur plankton, have been blasted as not
being based on sound science, harmful, and motivated by nothing but
profit. 85 Lastly, offsets purchased in developing countries under the Kyoto
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) are not required to be
sustainable or environmentally beneficial, and may only enrich the traders
themselves. 86
Moreover, verifying trades and offsets can be a daunting problem. It is
difficult to track small sources, such as the CO2 from the 300 million automobiles in the United States, 87 meaning that mobile source usage intensity
will not be a reliable offset. Offsets in foreign countries present particular
difficulties. The Kyoto Protocol’s CDM program which allows the purchase of offsets in foreign countries, 88 has been roundly criticized for the
questionable validity of the offsets purchased. 89 Creating an independent international agency to vet international offsets, perhaps in conjunction with
82

See Question Marks Over EU CO2 Trading Scheme, EURACTIVE.COM, June 29, 2007 ,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/sustainability/question-marks-eu-CO2-trading-scheme/article-155349 (link).
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See Critics Attack Offsetting Plan Near Galapagos Islands, GREENWIRE, Aug. 17, 2007, (link).
84
See S.G. Gibbard, K. Caldeira, G. Bala, T.J. Phillips, & M. Wicket, Climate Effects of Global
Land Cover Change, in GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS (Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab. 2005), available
at http://www.llnl.gov/tid/lof/documents/pdf/324200.pdf (link); see also Gustavo A. B. da Fonseca,
Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, Guy Midgley, Jonah Busch, Lee Hannah & Russell A. Mittermeier, No
Forest Left Behind, 5 PUB. LIBR. OF SCI. BIOLOGY 1645 (2007), available at
http://biology.plosjournals.org/archive/1545-7885/5/8/pdf/10.1371_journal.pbio.0050216-L.pdf (link).
85
See Upset About an Offset, http://blogs.wsj.com/energy/2007/08/16/upset-about-an-offset/ (Aug.
16, 2007, 16:37 EST).
86
London Profits, While Africa Awaits Kyoto Benefits, REUTERS, August 13, 2007, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL137011320070813 (link).
87
Trading Foes Hail EPA Region IX Report Criticizing RECLAIM Program, INSIDE EPA, Nov. 22,
2002, at 7.
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UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php (link) (last
visited Nov. 20, 2007).
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Press Release, Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, New Book Exposes Scandal of Carbon Trading,
available at http://www.dhf.uu.se/documents/Press_release_carbon_trading.pdf (link).
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the EU, may help ease international offset enforcement. With respect to
both international and domestic offsets, choosing limited, but heavily vetted
offset possibilities, while having a mechanism to approve new offsets that
“are in the public interest” is appropriate. This legislative choice will drive
lobbying and rent seeking for pet projects, but this may be the best alternative.
Seven of the current legislative proposals, Bingaman-Specter, UdallPetri, Lieberman-McCain, Kerry-Snowe, Sanders-Boxer, Feinstein-Carper,
and Alexander-Lieberman, specifically allow the use of offsets. 90 The
Waxman proposal does not specify the validity of particular offsets, but
does state that the goals of a GHG reduction program should encompass
“enhanced sequestration of carbon in the forest and agricultural sectors.” 91
The Stark and Larson tax system proposals do not allow offsets per se but
do propose tax credits (which can be seen as an “offset” in taxes) for certain
sequestration or GHG destruction projects. 92 Therefore all of the proposals
trigger the issues of concern with offsets.
The Waxman proposal may have the virtue of simplicity, but simply
encouraging “sequestration” in the “biological and agricultural sectors” pins
the EPA, which would administer the program, into a system in which most
of its research money would be spent in an area that is currently seen as less
promising than originally thought, and which might thus be an inefficient
way to reduce CO2. 93 The Kerry-Snowe proposal has the same problem, as
it tracks much of the language of the Waxman proposal, including investment in forest and agricultural sequestration (though it adds some other offsetting goals as well). 94 Focusing on a few offsets means that economic
interests associated with those offsets may be benefited while we fail to receive efficiency gains from other offsets that are not favored in the statute.
For instance, the Udall-Petri proposal embraces “unlimited” geological sequestration offsets. Though promising, 95 these offsets, which anticipate using spent oil and gas fields to store CO2 underground, have not been fully
tested, nor has the legality of title and usage (a traditionally state issue)
been considered. Lieberman-McCain addresses this issue by requiring that
any credited sequestration be re-verified every five years, which is one way
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to put a check on the system, but that bill also focuses too much on sequestration to the exclusion of other offset possibilities. 96
Since many potential offset sources have an economic interest in having their offset approved either by law or regulation, we should be particularly concerned with rent-seeking which is already part of the lobbying
effort. Sanders-Boxer leaves the determination of allowable offsets solely
to regulatory decisionmakers. 97 While this allows more flexibility with possible offsets and would also allow a system to recognize promising future
offsets, simply putting the decision in regulatory hands does not always
avoid undue pressure for approval of pet projects. In fact, at the regulatory
level, scrutiny of these choices might decrease.
Most of the proposals that address offsets anticipate that any U.S. trading system will allow trading internationally. Apparently because of the
difficulty of enforcement in this arena, several of the legislative proposals
(Bingaman-Specter, Lieberman-McCain, Feinstein-Carper, and AlexanderLieberman) cap the percentage of foreign offsets that any one producer can
purchase. Additionally, some (such as Lieberman-McCain and BingamanSpecter) have some system for verification of foreign offsets as well.
D. Other Issues (Safety Nets, Research Grants, CO2 Equivalents, and
Integration with Other Systems)
1. Safety Nets—Another important consideration is whether legislation would have a mechanism for avoiding large increases in cost for CO2
allotments. Bingaman-Specter and Udall-Petri currently propose a “safety
net” to protect American businesses from economic dislocation associated
with introduction of a cap-and-trade system. 98 CO2 safety nets usually set a
maximum price for allocations in a cap-and-trade system. David Montgomery, vice-president of CRA International and former Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Policy at the Department of Energy, suggests such a maximum price will protect those who are hit particularly hard by the newly internalized cost of CO2 production, and protect business from wild economic
disruptions. 99 Though controversial, safety nets have been proposed in
some of the legislation, presumably to assist in legislative passage. 100 How-
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ever, there is also criticism of such safety nets as undercutting the effectiveness of any cap-and-trade system. 101 In addition to undercutting the efficiency of a cap-and-trade system, such safety nets create another
opportunity for certain industries to seek special favors in legislation. Senator Boxer, chair of the Senate Environmental Committee, has indicated that
she would not support any legislation that included such a safety net. For
their part, Bingaman and Specter have indicated a willingness to look at
other options, 102 and Lieberman and Warner have said they will not agree to
add a safety net to their legislative proposal. 103 However, many legislators
seem predisposed to favor business relief as the cost of passing climate
change legislation. 104
Bingaman-Specter and Udall-Petri also include provisions to offset
“unfair” competition from countries, particularly developing countries, that
do not limit CO2 production. There has been less attention paid to these
provisions, and it is possible that they could be seen as encouraging foreign
governments to implement binding cuts. Whether this is appropriate from a
“goals” point of view must be discussed in that context; as an effective
mechanism for encouraging all countries to take their fair share of binding
cuts, it may or may not be effective. Though trade sanctions have been part
of worldwide environmental treaties before, unilateral imposition raises
questions of WTO violations. 105
2. Research and Development (R&D)—Grants for increasing technological solutions to climate change are prominent in the proposed legislation. Many environmentalists and think tanks suggest that federal climate
change legislation must include funds for alternative energy research,
claiming that it is a necessary investment in order to make CO2 reduction
less expensive, and there has already been significant research into technologies that might be particularly beneficial. 106 As with any government
grant, there is a significant risk that research funds will be spent improperly.
As an example of the dangers of government research grants, ethanol incen-
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tives have been lambasted for being wasteful, inefficient, harmful to the
poor, and a farm-state giveaway. 107
Five proposals, Bingaman-Specter, Udall-Petri, Lieberman-McCain,
Feinstein-Carper and Larson, provide for direct R&D grants. In the cap and
trade systems, these grants are to be funded from the money received from
the auctioned portion of CO2 allocations. 108 In the Larson tax proposal, six
billion dollars of carbon tax receipts would go towards research and development. 109 The most striking aspect of these proposals is that, despite the
abundance of free money on the table, there are few articulated standards
for determining who should get this money, beyond the fact that it should
contribute to a low carbon economy and be promising. The BingamanSpecter proposal has the greatest level of specification. It identifies specific
categories, including coal-fired plant efficiency, zero emission electricity
production, coal sequestration, cellulosic biomass, and lower vehicle emission technology, that may receive grants, and even specifies a rudimentary
formula for the awards. 110 Specificity about allowable R&D in legislation
can be both good and bad. With large amounts of money at stake, the preidentification of eligible technologies increases the probability of lobbying
for financial gain at the expense of funding for the most scientifically promising technologies. 111 However, if no specifications are set out for administratively awarding such grants, the award of the grants becomes a goal in
itself, rather than necessarily being an efficient way to encourage innovation.
There are political and economic arguments about whether direct
grants really do good or whether these issues should be left to the marketplace. The popularity of R&D among most factions supporting climate
change legislation, however, seems to indicate that it will be part of a comprehensive scheme. R&D which benefits certain areas of the country may
also be the necessary political “pork” to grease the wheels of Congressional
voting. 112
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3. CO2 Equivalents—Another issue that has not yet been thoroughly
explored in the current crop of proposals is the eligibility and handling of
other greenhouse gases as carbon dioxide equivalents. Overall, CO2 produces about 70% of global warming potential worldwide, but other gases,
such as refrigerants and methane, are far more potent contributors. The
Kyoto Protocol and other major climate change policies have recognized
this linkage, and the legislative provisions for the most part define a “Carbon Dioxide equivalent” uniformly: “For each greenhouse gas (other than
carbon dioxide), the quantity of carbon dioxide that would have an effect on
global warming equal to the effect of a unit of the greenhouse gas, as determined by the President, taking into consideration global warming potentials.” 113
While this seems direct enough, the details could get more complicated. Two issues in particular should be addressed: 1) should the greenhouse gas equivalents be limited, and 2) how should equivalency to CO2 be
determined. The Bingaman-Specter and Lieberman-McCain proposals define “greenhouse gases” as only including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide,
hydrochlorofluorocarbons,
perfluorocarbons,
and
sulfur
hexafluoride. 114 Waxman, Kerry-Snowe, and Boxer-Sanders, on the other
hand, add another provision to the definition of “greenhouse gas” which allows the administrator to designate additional greenhouse gases. Though
the Bingaman-Specter and Lieberman-McCain limitations of gases reflect
allowable gas equivalents in the Kyoto Protocol, having the possibility of
recognizing other gases maintains flexibility to identify other, more efficient reduction possibilities.
With respect to the second issue regarding equivalents, while Bingaman-Specter says the CO2 equivalency will be “determined by the President, taking into consideration global warming potential,” LiebermanMcCain (and other bills) simply allow determination by the administrator.
While this may seem a distinction without a difference, the additional requirement of taking into consideration global warming potential disallows
consideration of other important factors. Some reduction in greenhouse gas
equivalents may have collateral dangers, while other may have benefits.
For instance, by funneling money to offset more potent greenhouse
gases that impact other environmental effects, the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM
may be creating a market to allow more harmful gases to be sold for
credit. 115 But in developed countries, reductions of volatile organic com113
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pounds may also have collateral benefits in the reduction of ozone pollution
and toxic air pollution. This effect may be very large, and the related programs in the Clean Air Act should be examined in the formation of any
climate change legislation to ensure that these benefits (and possible costs)
are taken into account, or that the administrator can take them into account
in determining various benefits of relative reductions in different greenhouse gases.
4. Relationship to other CO2 trading systems—Finally, the relationship between any comprehensive cap-and-trade law and existing greenhouse gas control systems must be analyzed. Any trading or tax systems
should be able to integrate with other verified CO2 (or CO2 equivalent) trading systems. If the systems do not create an even playing field a conversion
process can be established. The same system can be implemented if usage
in different sectors is not equivalent.
Boxer-Sanders explicitly notes that verifiable state and local early reductions shall be recognized, meaning that any reductions taken pursuant to
the northeast greenhouse gas initiative will be valid. 116 Lieberman-McCain
takes a similar approach. 117 Lieberman-McCain goes on to allow verified
international trading allowances to satisfy 30% of allowable offsets, while
the Bingaman-Specter bill allows the use of comparable foreign emissions
credits to satisfy up to 10% of valid offsets. 118 Kerry-Snowe and Waxman
do not discuss state or international equivalent systems. Our legislation
need not slavishly follow another model and adopt its decisions on trading
price or offsets, but we must consider how these programs will interact because this interaction will affect the success and efficiency of the programs.
Other issues may be important in comprehensive climate change as
well. If energy legislation is considered, there could be many legislative
provisions to encourage energy conservation. With the costs of insurance
rising due to climate change, the government may need to address the availability of insurance or re-insurance. But the issues outlined above provide a
fairly comprehensive model of concerns for climate change legislation.
CONCLUSION
None of the current legislative proposals encompass all of the best options for each of these policy considerations, but the major bills, such as
Bingaman-Specter and Lieberman-McCain, could be altered to do so. Big
changes would require including an auction system (Stark proposes a 100%
116
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auction), resetting the target reductions in accord with international agreement, and establishing a binding target that is sufficient for harm avoidance
(most studies suggest that at least a 50% reduction in annual CO2 production from 1990 levels by mid-century is necessary to avoid the worst impacts, but 80% may better approach our responsibility).
Climate change legislation is complex; we cannot get by on vague calls
for CO2 reduction. The devil is in the details and the intent behind those details. While the current legislative proposals address some of the issues associated with climate change legislation, none do so completely; and
without examining all of the issues together, incorrect choices will be made.
Armed with a checklist of issues, we can weigh the benefits and harms of
current proposals and better tailor them to avoid climate change harms in a
fair and efficient manner. We may not all agree on necessary reduction levels, acceptable harms, or what is fair or efficient, but a focus on the issues in
this essay will make such discussions and decisions more transparent.
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